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The hidden benefits of abstaining from control 
Gabriel Burdín, Simon D. Halliday and Fabio Landini 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the role of negative reciprocity, positive reciprocity and preferences 
for autonomy in explaining agents’ reactions to control in experimental principal-agent 
games. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, 
recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity. 
To understand the behavioral mechanisms underlying such reactions, we conduct an 
experiment in which we compare two treatments: one in which control is exerted 
directly by the principal; and the other in which it is exerted by a third party enjoying no 
residual claimancy rights (third-party control). The results indicate that when either the 
principal or a third party decides to control the average level of effort that is selected by 
the agents is similar. What changes remarkably are the agents’ reactions to the decision 
of the other participants not to control. When the principal decides not to control, then 
the agent exerts greater effort relative to the case when the third party decides not to 
control. Agents seem to reward principals who abstain from control for their trust, rather 
than punish controlling ones for their distrust. 
 
JEL Codes: C72, C91, D23, M54 
 
Keywords: control aversion, autonomy, principal-agent game, social preferences, trust, 
negative reciprocity, positive reciprocity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In contemporary societies, significant resources are devoted to control people's actions. 
For instance, a substantial fraction of the labor force is allocated to supervisory tasks in 
both developed and developing countries (Acemoglu and Newman, 2002; Jayadev and 
Bowles, 2006; Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2006). According to figures computed from 
the European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), more than half (57%) of non-
supervisory employees lack procedural autonomy at work in at least one dimension (i.e. 
the ability to change or choose the order of tasks, the speed or rate of work and the 
method of work) and 42% perceive that their work rate depends on the direct control of 
their bosses. 1  Hence, understanding the precise behavioral mechanisms underlying 
people's reactions to control and their economic consequences are important concerns. 
 
Traditionally, two main streams of literature have focused on people’s reactions to 
control. On the one hand social psychologists have emphasized the role of individual 
orientations towards autonomy and control. According to Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT), human beings have a basic psychological need for autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 
1985). That is, humans require “a form of freedom in which a party experiences himself 
to be the locus of causality for his own behavior” (Gagné and Deci, 2005, p. 333). This 
approach sees people’s wellbeing as inseparable from their experience of personal and 
motivational autonomy (Chirkov et al, 2011) and considers the quest for autonomy as 
one of the main drivers of individual reactions to control.2  
 
On the other hand, behavioral economists have focused primarily on intention-based 
social preferences, in particular reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Von Siemens, 2013). Nowadays, there is ample evidence that 
many agents behave in a reciprocal manner even when acting on reciprocal preferences 
is costly and yields no future rewards (see, for instance, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). On 
                                                 
1 Own calculations from EWCS wave 2010. 
2  Several experiments conducted by psychologists in highly differentiated contexts have shown that 
environments supporting autonomy (control) to significantly increase (decrease) intrinsic motivations and 
prosocial behavior, and therefore that autonomy and control can severely affect task performance (see 
Gagné, 2003; Greene-Demers et al., 1997; Pelletier et al., 1998; Fabes et al., 1989; Kunda and Schwartz, 
1983; Upton, 1974; Batson et al., 1978; Sobus, 1995). Recent experimental evidence also suggests that 
individuals intrinsically value decisional autonomy over their own and others’ outcomes (Bartling et al, 
2014; Owens et al, 2014). Moreover, greater procedural autonomy and lower monitoring intensity appear 
to correlate positively with greater job satisfaction (Bartling et al, 2013). 
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this basis Falk and Kosfeld (2006, henceforth, F&K) have provided a reciprocity-based 
explanation for individual reactions to control. In a principal-agent game they explore 
the phenomena of hidden costs of control and the idea that ‘control aversion’ may be 
one of the reasons why incentives sometimes degrade performance. They found a 
sizeable fraction of agents react negatively to control and that control is not profitable, 
i.e. principals earn more if they leave agents to decide freely than if they control. F&K 
explain their result in terms of negative reciprocity on the side of the agents who punish 
the controlling principals for their distrust. An alternative interpretation can be based on 
positive reciprocity according to which the agents reward principals who abstain from 
control for their trust.3  
 
Although both the autonomy and the reciprocity explanations are plausible, there is still 
no clear evidence on their relative importance. F&K explored the agents’ emotional 
perception of control in their experiment and the most frequent answers among those 
agents who react negatively to control were distrust and lack of autonomy. However, 
the experimental design does not allow the authors to separate the explanatory role of 
these two motives. Moreover, subsequent replications of F&K’s study (e.g. 
Ziegelmeyer et al, 2012) confirmed the existence of a hidden costs of control, namely 
the fact that a large fraction of agents reacts negatively to control by lowering their level 
of effort, but they failed to replicate the finding that such costs outweigh the benefit of 
control. 
 
In this paper we extend F&K’s experimental design to separate the role of autonomy 
and reciprocity in explaining how individuals react to control in a principal-agent 
relationship. We vary their experiment to permit it to include three parties: the principal, 
who benefits from the effort of the agent, the agent, and a third party who is given a 
show-up fee and chooses whether or not to exert control over the agent, but does not 
directly benefit from the agent’s actions (i.e. he does not have any claim over the 
residual). On this basis, we obtain two main results. First, we reject autonomy as a 
                                                 
3 Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and Sliwka (2007) provide an alternative explanation for F&K’s 
results in terms of image concern and conformism, respectively. While Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) 
present an alternative way of modeling a reciprocity-based reaction to control, Sliwka (2007) exploits the 
tendency to conform to a generalized social norm to explain control aversion. Although in this paper we 
do not explicitly compare alternative type of social preferences, our results suggest that reciprocity-based 
explanations are more reliable than conformism-based ones and we thus stick to reciprocity as the main 
reference in our analysis. 
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motive to explain agent’s behavior in F&K’s stylized principal-agent interaction. When 
a third party instead of the principal exerts control, the fraction of agents that reduce 
performance dramatically decreases and control results in a greater expected profit for 
the principal. Moreover, regression analysis shows no correlation between the 
probability of performing worse when exposed to control and a psychological measure 
of autonomy orientation (General Causality Orientation Scale; GCOS). In contrast, we 
find a significantly negative correlation between this probability and individuals' control 
orientation as measured by GCOS. Overall, reactions to control appear not to be driven 
(at least in this very specific and highly stylized experimental setting) by agents' 
preference for autonomy. 
 
The second result that we obtain is that, in line with Ziegelmeyer et al (2012), we fail to 
replicate F&K’s finding on the negative effect of control for the principal’s profit. 
Although we largely confirm that when the principal is exerting control there exist 
hidden costs, we find that the latter are not substantial enough to significantly 
undermine the benefits of control. In our setting, however, the comparison with the case 
in which control is exerted by a third party makes it possible to enrich the interpretation 
of such a result. When either the principal or a third party decides to control the average 
level of effort that is selected by the agents is similar. What changes remarkably is the 
agent’s reaction to the decision of not controlling. When a third party makes such a 
decision, it results in a significant lower level of effort. On the contrary, when the 
principal makes the decision not to control, it results in a level of effort that is equal to 
the case in which control is exerted. In this sense the behavioral response that F&K 
interpret as a negative reaction to the principal’s choice of controlling (i.e. negative 
reciprocity) seems more sensibly interpreted as a positive reaction to the principal’s 
choice not to control when he had the option to do so (i.e. positive reciprocity with 
respect to the choice of abstaining from control). In other words, in our experiments 
trust seems to have hidden benefits that make it a suitable substitute for a principal’s 
control. As a result, principals who do not exert control perform as well as principals 
who do control. The same is not true when the option to control is in the hands of a 
neutral third party, as in that case control is by far the most profitable choice.  
 
The paper contributes to the growing experimental economics literature on authority 
and control in organizations (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; 
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Sliwka, 2007; Ziegelmeyer et al, 2012; Fehr et al., 2013; Charness et al., 2012; 
Schnedler and Vadovic, 2011; Riener and Wiederhold , 2016). The study also adds to 
the literature on crowding out (in) effects of incentives on intrinsic motives (see Frey 
and Jegen, 2000; Bowles and Polanía, 2012). Finally, the paper contributes to the 
research agenda in organizational economics trying to improve the mapping of 
individual preferences and assessing the consequences of the mismatch between 
preferences and organization design (Ben Ner, 2013). By deepening the study of the 
behavioral motives underlying reactions to control, the results presented in this paper 
may have implications for key aspects of organizational design, such as the optimal 
level of employees' discretion and monitoring practices. Specifically, our results may 
provide a rationale for why principals should retain control without exerting it rather 
than delegating control to a neutral third party. In the presence of reciprocal types, the 
principal’s decision not to control may trigger workers' good behavioral dispositions, 
which translate into a level of effort that compensates the costs of running into some 
degree of shirking. On the contrary, when the option to control is delegated to a neutral 
third party (e.g. consultancies, governments) such trust-based behavioral dispositions 
are difficult to induce and the performance of the organization may worsen. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the experimental 
design, including the original F&K design and our third-party treatment. Section 3 
discusses the behavioral predictions. Section 4 describes practical procedures related to 
the experiment. Section 5 presents the main results. Finally, in section 6 we conclude 
and discuss potential extensions.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
Principal-agent game 
 
In order to test the extent to which reactions to control depend on both reciprocity and 
autonomy we rely on a simple laboratory experiment. The experiment is based on the 
two-stage principal-agent game used in F&K and replicated in Ziegelmeyer et al (2012). 
The agent chooses a productive activity x, which is costly to him but beneficial for the 
principal. The monetary cost for the agent is c(x) = x, while the benefit for the principal 
is 2x; i.e., the marginal cost of providing the productive activity is always smaller than 
 6 
the marginal benefit. The agent has an initial endowment of 120 experimental currency 
units (ECUs), while the endowment of the principal is 0.  
 
Before the agent decides on x, the principal determines the agent's choice set. The 
principal can either restrict the agent's choice set, in which case the agent can choose 
any integer value 𝑥 ∈ {𝑥, 𝑥 + 1,… , 120} , or the principal can leave the choice set 
unrestricted to 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1, … , 120}. Thus the principal can control the agent’s decision 
environment, thereby guaranteeing a minimal payoff of 2x, or the principal can leave 
the decision completely up to the agent, trusting that the agent will not choose an x 
below x.4 
 
Treatments 
 
We conjecture that the principal’s choice to control has two main effects. First, as 
conjectured by F&K, it motivates reciprocity on the side of the agent. Second, as a 
consequence of a reduction in decisional autonomy, it crowds out the agent’s intrinsic 
motivation to contribute. We call the first the reciprocity effect, and the second the 
autonomy effect. In order to separate these two effects we consider 2 distinct treatments: 
Treatment 1 (C10) and Treatment 2 (TP10). In C10, the principal chooses whether or 
not to control (replicating F&K’s baseline treatment with 10=x ). In TP10 the decision 
to control is taken by a neutral third party (i.e. a subject outside the main principal-agent 
interaction) whose payoff is not affected by the agent’s choice as the third party is only 
paid a show-up fee ($5). The third party chooses whether or not to require 10= xx . 
Each agent makes their decision using the strategy method specifying the level of x in 
the condition when the principal exerts control and the level of x when the principal 
does not exert control, or, in the TP10 treatment, the level of x in the condition when the 
third party exerts control and the level of x when the third party does not exert control. 
Since in TP10 the principal is only a passive player, no reciprocity motive can explain 
the agent’s behavior in this treatment.  
 
                                                 
4 The design does not involve different treatments in which principals can make choices to control or not. 
Control is not a treatment but is a strategy (the principal can decide either to control or to abstain from 
control of the agent). We can identify agents’ reactions under both conditions by using the strategy 
method. 
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The treatment TP10 is different from the treatment EX10 included in F&K’s original 
design. In EX10 the principal and the agent play only the sub-game that follows the 
decision to control in treatment C10. Such a treatment is thus used to control for the 
effects associated with an exogenously given smaller size of the agent’s choice set. By 
fixing the size of the choice set ex-ante, however, EX10 cannot control for the effect 
associated with an exogenous variation in the size of the choice set, i.e. an exogenous 
variation in decisional autonomy. This can be important as long as the initial size of the 
choice set is seen as a reference point against which the imposed variation is compared.5 
Finally, the design is between subjects as in F&K.  
 
Questionnaire study 
 
In addition to the experiment we conduct a questionnaire study to help evaluating the 
subjects’ motivations. In contrast with previous research on control aversion, we do not 
use F&K’s standard questionnaire. Rather, we use a psychological questionnaire aimed 
at measuring the strength of individuals’ considerations for choices considering the 
roles of impersonal, autonomous or controlling forces (Deci and Ryan, 1985). The 
questionnaire is called the General Causality Orientation Survey (GCOS) and it has 
been used and verified in a variety of circumstances to understand peoples’ preferences 
for self-determination or autonomy. In the GCOS, subjects answer questions relating to 
their preferences for an autonomy orientation, impersonal orientation, or control 
orientation. As the study focuses on adults' decisions in an economic setting, we employ 
the original 12-vignette version of the GCOS (see complete questionnaire in Appendix 
B).  
 
Deci and Ryan define each of the orientations in the following ways. A person’s 
autonomy orientation involves, “a high degree of experienced choice in the initiation 
and regulation of one’s own behavior” and people who rate highly on the autonomy 
orientation “seek out opportunities for self-determination and choice” (p. 111) or they 
are more likely to experience intrinsic motivation. With the control orientation, people 
“seek out, select or interpret events as controlling” with a person who is rated highly on 
the scale being motivated significantly by extrinsic benefits and rewards. Lastly, with 
                                                 
5 An extended literature on a different but related topic shows that contract arrangements can play an 
important role as reference point in buyer-seller interactions. See, for instance, Fehr et al., (2011). 
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the impersonal orientation people experience their behavior as “beyond their intentional 
control.” A person who rates highly on the impersonal orientation may view himself or 
herself as incompetent, or see their behavior as subject to the whims of impersonal 
forces.  
 
 
3. Behavioral Predictions 
 
To outline the behavioral predictions of our experiment let us consider the case of 
purely distributional preferences first. There is ample evidence that many people are 
endowed with social preferences such as concern for equity. These intrinsic motives, for 
example, have been used to explain the fact that in dictator games proposers often give 
positive amount of money (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002). On the basis of these motives we should expect a large 
fraction of agents in our principal-agent game to choose an activity x that is strictly 
larger than the minimum. Moreover, whenever the agent’s choice exceeds constraint 
x=10 we should observe no significant difference between the level of action x under 
the control and no-control condition (i.e. constraint x ≥ x is not binding). Finally, no 
significant difference in agent’s behavior should emerge between the two treatments 
C10 and TP10, as the only agent’s concern is the distribution of payoffs.  
 
F&K show that in treatment C10 the observed agent’s behavior significantly deviates 
from these predictions. Although the majority of agents selects an activity x that is well 
above the minimum, a large fraction of them select a lower level of x when the principal 
decides to control than when the principal decides not to control. They call the latter the 
“hidden costs of control”. Moreover, they find that the average level of x under the 
control condition is significantly smaller than the average level of x under the no-control 
condition, i.e. “the hidden costs of control outweigh the benefits of control.” As argued 
above F&K’s interpretation is based on negative reciprocity. Agents that are 
intrinsically motivated to act in the principal’s interest perceive control as a signal that 
the principal does not expect them to perform well. Some agents might perceive this as 
a signal of distrust; others might take it as an indication of how much voluntary 
performance the principal expects. In both cases, the agent reacts by choosing a lower 
performance than he would have chosen if the principal had decided not to control. 
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With regard to TP10, where no reciprocity motives are at stake, F&K would predict no 
hidden costs of control as well as no significant difference in the average level of x 
selected under the two control conditions for those subjects for which control is not 
binding (x≥10). In addition, the average level of x selected in TP10 should be similar to 
the one observed in C10 when no control is exerted. In the latter condition, in fact, the 
agent does not punish the principal for his distrust and his decision depends on equity 
concerns only. 
 
Alternatively, the behavior of the agent in treatment C10 can be interpreted in terms of 
positive reciprocity. According to this view, intrinsically motivated agents reward the 
principals for the choice of not controlling, rather than punishing them for the choice of 
controlling. With respect to C10 the behavioral predictions are the same as in the case of 
negative reciprocity: a) a large fraction of agents select larger level of x when the 
principal decides not to control than when the principal decides to control and b) the 
average level of action x is greater under the no-control condition than under the control 
condition. The difference is that in this case prediction a) can be reinterpreted as 
suggesting the existence of “hidden benefits of abstaining from control” rather than 
“hidden costs of control.” Moreover, behavioral predictions differ with regard to TP10. 
In the latter case, in fact, the presence of a neutral third party reduces the possibility to 
reciprocate trust with greater performance so that the level of activity x when the third 
party decides not to control should be lower than or equal to the level of activity x when 
the third party decides to control.6 At the same time the level of activity x under the 
control condition should be similar to the one observed under the control condition in 
C10, when the agent does not reward the principal for his trust and his decision depends 
on equity concerns only. Therefore, on the basis of positive reciprocity one should 
predict benefits of abstaining from control in C10: the level of x under the no-control 
condition in C10 is higher than or equal to the level of x under the no-control condition 
in TP10 and the level x under the control condition is the same in both C10 and TP10.   
 
Finally, the agent’s behavior in our principal-agent game can be interpreted on the basis 
of Self-Determination Theory (SDT). According to SDT the lack of decisional 
                                                 
6 To be more precise, under no control in TP10 the average transfer should be lower than the average 
transfer under control in TP10 whenever the transfer induced by the distributional preference is lower 
than the minimum threshold. 
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autonomy is one of the main factors that crowd out intrinsic motivations in human 
interactions. As stated above in our setting intrinsic motives are reflected by the 
existence of equity concerns, which have been shown to play a relevant role in this type 
of games. At the same time the results of a questionnaire study reported by F&K 
suggest that “distrust” and “lack of autonomy” are the two most common feelings 
among controlled agents, which suggest that also autonomy concerns are important. On 
this basis SDT would predict that being exposed to control will crowd out the agent’s 
equity concerns, reducing the level of action x compared to the case of no control. This 
result should hold independently of the subject exerting control, namely the principal or 
a third party. Therefore the behavioral predictions could be summarized in the existence 
of hidden costs of control in both C10 and TP10.  
 
4. Practical Procedures 
 
As in F&K and Ziegelmeyer et al (2012), all experiments were facilitated with the use 
of z-Tree experimental economics software (Fischbacher, 2007). We used a modified 
version of the official English-language translations of the F&K instructions, with the 
minor modifications proposed by the Institutional Review Board of Smith College to 
make certain differences clear to home language English-speakers.  
 
All sessions were conducted at the Cleve E. Willis Experimental Economics Laboratory 
at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Subjects were invited using the ORSEE 
recruitment system (Greiner, 2015). All subjects were students at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. Subjects did not participate in more than one session. Most 
subjects had participated in at least one other economics experiment, but all were 
inexperienced in that they had not participated in an experiment of this type before. The 
subjects interacted only once and each session lasted 45 minutes on average (including 
time for private payment). Table A.1 summarizes the experimental conditions of the 
two experiments. Excluding the show-up fee ($5), participants earned an average of 
$10.47. Subjects in the C10 treatment earned $13.93 on average, whereas subjects in the 
TP10 experiment earned $9.11 on average (excluding the third party, average payoffs in 
TP10 are $13.67).  
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At the start of each experimental session subjects arrived and randomly drew a cubicle 
number. Cubicles are separated from each other visually and physically. Subjects are 
prohibited from speaking. In C10, half of the subjects were assigned the role of 
principal and half of the subjects were assigned the role of agent. In TP10, one third of 
the subjects were assigned to the role of principal, one third to the role of agent, and one 
third to the role of third party. All subjects received a common set of instructions and all 
questions were answered privately.  
 
As in F&K and Ziegelmeyer et al (2012), the subjects’ understanding of the players’ 
choice sets and payoffs were assured by three control questions. Once all subjects had 
answered the control questions correctly (with opportunities to ask questions privately), 
the subjects played the principal-agent experiment (C10) or principal-agent-third party 
experiment (TP10) once. After they had played and before they received information 
about their payoffs, they filled out the General Causality Orientation Scale discussed in 
section 2 and a basic demographic survey. Responding to the questionnaire was not 
incentivized and subjects were told that their responses on the survey were not 
connected to their final payments. After completing the survey, a payment screen 
showed final earnings in the experiment. Once payment information was revealed, 
subjects were called to a cubicle to receive their final earnings privately (including the 
show-up fee). One ECU was equivalent to $0.20. 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section, we present our findings about the replication of the F&K experiment 
(C10) and discuss the subject’s answers to the questionnaires. We proceed to discuss the 
results from the third-party variation (TP10) and the answers to the questionnaires in 
that experiment.  
 
We report results from two-sided statistical tests and we either reject or do not reject the 
relevant null hypotheses based on a 5 percent level of significance. Consequently, any 
reference to “significance” in this section should be read as referring to statistical rather 
than economic or substantive significance. We refer to the agents’ choices as occurring 
in either the “control” or “no-control” setting, consistent with Ziegelmeyer et al (2012).  
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The sample comprises 235 subjects: 76 subjects in the C10 treatment with 38 subjects 
playing the role of the principal and 38 the role of the agent; 159 subjects in the TP10 
treatment with 53 subjects playing the role of the principal, 53 the agent and 53 the third 
party. Much of the analysis refers to transfers x (by the agent to the principal).  
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 The replication (C10) 
 
Result 1: We observe significant hidden costs of control (or benefits of abstaining from 
control) in C10.  
 
First, consistent with F&K, we present the cumulative distributions of the players’ 
transfers in Figure 1. The no-control distribution is shown by the solid line and the 
control distribution is shown by the dashed line. Were there no hidden costs of control 
(or benefits of abstaining from control) then the two distributions would coincide for all 
x ≥ x. On the contrary, the distributions differ. For each value of xx   there are more 
agents in the no-control condition who choose at least that value of x than in the control 
condition. For instance, more than 40% of agents choose 20x when they are not 
controlled. In contrast, less than 20% of agents choose 20x  if controlled and, hence, 
many are forced to choose at least 10. A greater mass of x-choices is centered at 10=x  
if the principal restricts the agent's actions. 
 
Second, examining the distributions in greater detail, we follow F&K and Ziegelmeyer 
et al (2012) by constructing a modified distribution for the no-control condition, such 
that all xx   in the no-control condition are set equal to 𝑥 . We reject the null 
hypothesis that the modified distribution from the no-control setting and the distribution 
from the control setting are the same (Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired 
observations, z = -3.385, p = 0.007).  
 
We can therefore confirm the results from F&K and from Ziegelmeyer et al, that there 
are significant costs of control in dyadic principal-agent relationships. But, as 
Ziegelmeyer et al argue, we should be particularly concerned about hidden costs of 
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control if they are economically substantial and large enough to undermine the use of 
incentives in relevant settings. That is, do the costs of control outweigh the benefits of 
control? Consistent with Ziegelmeyer et al (2012), but inconsistent with F&K, in our 
replication we find that the costs of control do not outweigh the benefits.  
 
 
Fig.1. Cumulative distributions of transfers for C10 (n = 38) 
 
Result 2: We find at best weak evidence for a negative effect of control in C10 
 
Table 1 presents the agents’ transfers as a function of the principals’ decisions in the 
two treatments. The first row presents the average transfers for each of the control 
(column 1) and no-control (column 2) conditions in the treatments and the difference 
between the two (column 3). The second row for each treatment reports the standard 
deviation, followed by the 1st quartile, the median, and the 3rd quartile. For the 
difference between xNC and xC, the 95% bootstrap confidence interval is reported in the 
second row based on 105 replications.7  
 
                                                 
7 F&K do not compute bootstrap confidence intervals. However, we have computed them based on the 
data available as supplementary materials to their article. Our calculations provided the following 
information on their three treatments based on the value of xNC – xC reported as follows: mean [bootstrap 
confidence interval]:  C5 Treatment: 12.92 [8.47, 17.39]; C10 Treatment: 5.46 [2.75, 8.17], C20 
Treatment: 1.31 [-3.06, 5.69]. These results are consistent with those reported in Ziegelmeyer et al, who 
also performed bootstrap confidence intervals with F&K’s data.  
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In C10, the mean and median are higher in the no-control condition than in the control 
condition but the difference is not significant at the 5%. The 95% bootstrap confidence 
interval of the difference xNC – xC includes zero suggesting that the hidden costs of 
control (benefits of abstaining from control) do not significantly outweigh the benefits 
of control.8 On the contrary, the 90% confidence interval excludes zero so there is at 
best weak evidence for a negative effect of control as in F&K.9  
    
Table 1 
Agents' Transfers as a function of the principal's decision 
 
 Control Condition No-control condition xNC – xC 
C10 17.47 
(11.76, 10, 10, 20) 
21.24 
(19.03, 0, 18.5, 40) 
3.76 
[-.71, 8.24] 
 
TP10 
18 
(11.62, 10, 10, 25) 
12.87 
(15.50, 0, 5, 30) 
-5.13 
[-6.53, -3.73] 
Notes: Mean agents' transfers. Standard deviation, 1st quartile, median, and 3rd quartile reported in 
parentheses. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the difference xNC – xC 
 
5.2 The third-party treatment (TP10) 
 
Result 3: We do not observe hidden costs of control (benefits of abstaining from 
control) in TP10 
 
In Figure 2, we show the cumulative distributions of transfers in the control (dashed 
line) and no-control (solid line) conditions. When there are no hidden costs of control 
(or benefits of abstaining from control), the values of the cumulative distributions ought 
to coincide for all x ≥ x. As can be seen in the CDFs, the two distributions 
approximately coincide for all x ≥ x.  
 
We also compare modified distributions in TP10, where we replace all x<10 by x=10. 
We do not reject the null hypothesis that the modified distribution from the no-control 
                                                 
8 We should note, however, that though we cannot reject the null that the bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval includes zero, we also cannot reject that it includes 5.46 (the average from F&K’s experiment). 
9 The 90% confidence interval is [.016, 7.51]. 
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setting and the distribution from the control setting are the same (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test for paired observations, z = 0.840, p = 0.4007).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Cumulative Distributions of Transfers from TP10, n = 53 Agents 
 
Result 4: The total effect of control is beneficial in TP10 
 
The properties of Table 1 were discussed in detail in Result 2. In TP10, the mean 
transfer is lower in the no-control condition than in the control condition. The x 
transferred by the agent is significantly lower in the no-control condition than in the 
control condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank z = 5.030, p < 0.01). The mean of the 
difference xNC – xC is negative and the bootstrap confidence interval around the mean 
excludes zero. Referring to Table 2, the expected payoff to a principal when a third 
party exerts control is greater than the expected payoff to a principal when a third party 
does not exert control. Therefore, the total effect of control is beneficial. 
 
5.3 Comparing C10 and TP10  
 
Result 5: We observe hidden benefits of abstaining from control. In the no-control 
condition, agents’ transfers are lower in TP10 than in C10; in the control condition, 
transfers are similar across the two treatments. 
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Differences in agents’ reaction to control in TP10 compared to C10 suggest that 
intention-based social preferences rather than preferences for autonomy account for the 
observed behavior in this particular experimental setting.  However, it is not clear which 
type of reciprocity model fits the data better.  As discussed in section 3, agents may be 
rewarding the principals for the choice of not controlling (positive reciprocity) or 
punishing them for the choice of controlling (negative reciprocity). 
 
We provide further evidence by comparing the two treatments under both the control 
and no-control condition. It is immediately evident from Table 1 that the average 
transfer in the control condition is similar across the two treatments (17.47 and 18). In 
contrast, the average transfer in the no-control condition is substantially higher in C10 
than in TP10 (21.24 and 12.87). We then compare the distributions under the control 
and no-control conditions between the two treatments using Kruskal-Wallis tests. For 
the control condition, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are 
equivalent across the two treatments (Χ2 = 0.007 (1 d.f), p = 0.9326). For the no-control 
condition, we reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are equivalent (Χ2 = 4.048 
(1 d.f.), p = 0.0442).  
 
The result above sheds light on the specific behavioral mechanism at work in the F&K 
experiment. The fact that effort is higher in C10 than in TP10 in the no-control 
condition suggests that the interpretation of the result in terms of “hidden benefits of 
abstaining from control” rather than in terms of “hidden cost of control” is more 
convincing. Interestingly, effort is not smaller in C10 than in TP10 in the control 
condition. Hence. the behavioral response that F&K interpret as a negative reaction to 
the principal’s choice of controlling seems more sensibly interpreted as a positive 
reaction to the principal’s choice of not to controlling. 
 
As a consequence of using the strategy method to elicit the agents’ choices, we can 
observe whether the players are heterogeneous in their types by gaining greater 
understanding of whether players react positively (i.e. they increase the transfer), 
neutrally (i.e. they do not vary the transfer) or negatively (i.e. they reduce the transfer) 
to the choice of abstaining from control (control abstinence). 
 
Result 6: Players react to control abstinence heterogeneously in both treatments.  
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Table 2 summarizes the agent’s responses to control abstinence in each of the 
experiments. In C10, our result where 42.10% of agents react positively to control 
abstinence are consistent with Ziegelmeyer et al who found a proportion of agents who 
lower the transfer when controlled in the range 40.62% to 45.45%. 10  This result 
contrasts with F&K who found that a majority of agents (56.94%) reduced performance 
when controlled. The proportion of agents who react negatively to control abstinence 
(36.84%) is consistent with Ziegelmeyer et al (39.40% to 60.00% in various C10 
experiments) rather than relative to F&K (25% in C10). In C10, the minority of subjects 
responds neutrally to control abstinence (21.05%). Agents who positively reciprocate 
control abstinence transfer approximately the same in C10 as they do in in F&K and in 
Ziegelmeyer et al, that is, they transfer roughly double in the no-control condition 
relative to the control condition. Agents who respond neutrally to control abstinence 
transfer (25.13) within the range of what they did in F&K (22.3) and Ziegelmeyer et al 
(range: 14.8 to 30.71).11 
  
Table 2 
Agents' behavioral reactions to control abstinence 
 
  Negative Neutral Positive Expected 
Transfer to 
P 
C10 Relative Share 36.84% 21.05% 42.11%  
 
Mean Control 
Transfer 
 
11.64 
(4.40) 
 
25.13 
(19.16) 
 
18.75 
(9.40) 
 
17.47 
 
Mean no-control 
Transfer 
 
1.93 
(5.09) 
 
25.13 
(19.16) 
 
36.19 
(10.23) 
 
21.24 
 
 
TP10 Relative Share 54.72% 41.51% 3.77%  
 
Mean Control 
Transfer 
 
 
10.76 
(2.21) 
 
27.36 
(12.67) 
 
20 
(7.07) 
 
18 
Mean no-control 
Transfer 
1.14 
(2.70) 
27.36 
(12.67) 
23.5 
(9.19) 
12.87 
Notes: n = 38 in C10 and n = 53 in TP10; Expected Transfer to P is calculated as a weighted average 
where the mean transfer in each condition is multiplied by the proportion of each type 
 
                                                 
10 Ziegelmeyer et al. follow F&K in interpreting the results of their experiment in terms of negative 
reciprocity. It follows that their classification considers negative, neutral and positive reactions to the 
choice of controlling rather than positive, neutral and negative reactions to the choice of not controlling. 
11 In the Online Appendix (Tables OA.1 and OA.2), we use regression analysis to examine the extent to 
which our results differ from those in F&K and Ziegelmeyer et al. 
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In TP10, on the other hand, few agents respond positively to control abstinence 
(3.77%), a large proportion responds neutrally to control abstinence (41.51%) and the 
majority of agents respond negatively to control abstinence (54.72%). Of those agents 
who respond negatively to control abstinence, 86% increased their payoffs to exactly 10 
when controlled. That is, they experienced control as binding on their choices. These 
results are consistent with the preceding results examining the distributions of transfers 
and the difference between control and no-control transfers. We follow Ziegelmeyer et 
al (2012) in using Fisher’s exact tests to compare the frequencies of type of reaction 
across treatments. Fisher’s exact tests contrasting differences in frequencies between the 
treatments suggest the following: we reject the null hypothesis that the frequencies are 
equal for neutral responses to control abstinence (p = 0.045) and positive responses to 
control abstinence (p < 0.001), but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
proportions are equal for negative responses to control abstinence (p = 0.136).12   
 
Result 7: The proportions of principals and third parties who exert control are not 
significantly different 
 
In C10, 63.15% of principals exert control. In TP10, 77.34% of third parties exert 
control (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.163). A 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the 
difference in the proportions contains zero (-0.051 < pC10 – pTP10 < 0.335). These results 
are consistent with Ziegelmeyer et al who found proportions of control ranging from 
57% to 83% in their C10 treatments. Both our results and Ziegelmeyer et al’s results 
suggest significantly higher proportions of control than F&K who found 29% of 
principals choosing control. 
 
5.4 Agents’ reactions to control abstinence and GCOS score 
 
Finally, we study the correlation between agents’ reactions to control abstinence and 
their corresponding scores in the GCOS. As mentioned, the questionnaire measures the 
strength of individuals’ considerations for choices considering the roles of impersonal, 
autonomous or controlling forces (Deci and Ryan, 1985). The purpose of this exercise is 
to test whether the GCOS, widely used in social psychology, is able to capture in 
                                                 
12 We also include Figure OA.1 in the Online Appendix, which contrasts the frequencies of each reaction 
type (negative, neutral, positive) by treatment.  
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reasonable ways the observed heterogeneity in individuals’ reactions to control 
abstinence in an incentive-compatible experiment.  
 
For robustness across the treatments, we confirm that the samples are not statistically 
significantly different with respect to the subjects’ reported attitudes using the GCOS. 
The means and standard deviations for the subjects’ reported preference for each scale 
in each of the treatments are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Summary of General Causality Orientation Scale Indexes for Agents Only 
 
 C10 TP10 t-stat/ 
(Mann-Whitney z) 
GCOS: Autonomy Scale 73.53 71.30 1.56554 
 (5.99) (7.138) (1.468) 
GCOS: Impersonal Scale 43.32 44.19 -.4022743 
 (10.64) (9.892) (-0.443) 
GCOS: Control Scale 59.66 58.45 .7656292 
 (7.235) (7.523) (0.782)  
Observations 38 53 91 
Notes: Mean values. Standard deviation in parentheses. 12-vignette version of the GCOS (Deci and Ryan, 
1985). Complete questionnaire included in the Online Appendix as well as the summary statistics for the 
entire sample. See also Figure A.1 in Appendix A. 
 
The means in the scales are not statistically significantly different across treatments, as 
shown by the t-statistics of the difference between their values by treatment.13 The 
regressions report results for our data only as F&K or Ziegelmeyer et al did not gather 
the GCOS attitudes.  
  
In Table 4 the first column represents an OLS regression with xNC (the transfer in the 
no-control condition). Column 2 uses the transfer difference xNC – xC as the dependent 
variable as in F & K and Ziegelmeyer et al. In specifications 3 through 5, the dependent 
variable was a dummy variable indicating whether a subject displayed a negative 
(neutral or positive) response to control abstinence.  
 
The standardized control GCOS variable was statistically significant and negative in the 
xNC and xNC – xC regression (columns 1 and 2), the negative response to control 
abstinence logit regression (column 3) and the positive response to control abstinence 
                                                 
13 Regarding the internal consistency of each of the three subscales, the Cronbach’s α non-standardized 
values were autonomy, 0.8469; impersonal, 0.7394; and control, 0.6218.  
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logit regression (column 4). A one standard deviation increase in the standardized 
control scale corresponds with a decrease in the probability a subject will respond 
positively to control abstinence by 6.4%, an increase in the probability the subject will 
respond negatively by 16.6%, a decrease in the transfer (xNC) in the no-control 
condition, and an decrease in the difference between xNC and xC of 2.17 units of x (with 
the coefficient of -2.17, the difference increases in magnitude). 
 
 
Table 4 
Regressions from our Subject Pool Only (n = 91) with GCOS variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES xNC xNC - xC Negative  Neutral Positive  
      
D: TP10 Treatment = 1 -8.235** -8.864*** 0.193* 0.216** -0.403*** 
 (3.875) (2.444) (0.111) (0.0961) (0.0830) 
Standardized Autonomy Scale 3.090 1.198 -0.105 0.0800 0.00241 
 (1.885) (1.363) (0.0676) (0.0615) (0.0320) 
Standardized Impersonal Scale -0.190 -0.611 -0.0465 0.0343 0.0149 
 (2.167) (1.259) (0.0644) (0.0533) (0.0294) 
Standardized Control Scale -4.573** -2.177* 0.166** -0.0675 -0.0641** 
 (2.265) (1.303) (0.0701) (0.0514) (0.0299) 
Constant 20.76*** 3.551    
 (3.136) (2.324)    
      
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.131 0.212    
Log Likelihood   -57.47 -54.16 -32.22 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This result is consistent with the psychological interpretation given to the control 
orientation, which assesses the extent to which a person is oriented toward being 
controlled by rewards and the directives of others (Deci and Ryan, 1985). In line with 
the idea that agents’ reactions to control in the experiment are not driven by individuals' 
preferences for self-determination, the standardized autonomy GCOS does not show 
significant correlation either with the probability that the subject will respond positively 
to control abstinence or with the difference between xNC and xC. This result, however, 
should be interpreted cautiously as large standard errors may simply be due to a lack of 
statistical power. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
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We provide further evidence on the behavioral motives underlying individual reactions 
to control in an experimental principal-agent game by introducing a third-party 
treatment. First, in line with Ziegelmeyer et al (2012), we fail to replicate F&K’s 
finding on the negative effect of control for the principal’s profit. Although we largely 
confirm that a large fraction of agents exert lower effort under the control condition 
than under the no-control condition, we find that the proportion is not substantial 
enough to significantly undermine the benefits of control. Second, in the presence of a 
third party rather than a principal who exerts control, the fraction of agents that reduce 
performance dramatically decreases and control results in a greater expected profit for 
the principal. But, this should not be viewed as a form of delegation or the third party 
acting on behalf of (or at the orders of) the principal,14 rather it suggests that the agents 
respond reciprocally toward the principals in C10, but do not have that motive in TP10.  
 
Indeed, we find that when either the principal or a third party decides to control the 
average level of effort that is selected by the agents is similar. The difference between 
the two treatments is entirely driven by the agent’s reaction to the decision not to 
control. When a third party decides not to control, the decision results in a significant 
lower level of effort by the agent compared to the case in which the decision not to 
control is taken by the principal. This favors an interpretation of the results in terms of 
positive reciprocity: agents reciprocate not controlling principals with greater effort 
rather than punishing controlling ones with lower effort (see for instance, Levine 1998). 
Our interpretation has important implications for the design of organizations. Rather 
than delegating control to third parties (e.g. consultancies, governments), as suggested 
by F&K’s interpretation based on negative reciprocity, a principal would find it 
beneficial to be in a position in which he could control, but then abstain from doing so.  
 
One could argue that the treatment EX10 conducted by F&K is a proper baseline 
treatment whereas our TP10 is not and, therefore, that our interpretation in terms of 
positive reciprocity is not guaranteed.15 While it is true that the actions of the third party 
                                                 
14 The effect of delegation of responsibility is studied, for instance, by Bartling and Fischbacher (2011), 
Coffman (2011) and Oexl and Grossman (2013). With respect to control aversion it could be interesting 
to study the factors that affect the perceived responsibility of delegated control. This aspect, however, 
goes beyond the scope of the present paper and is thus left for future research.  
15 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation. As explained in section 2, in EX10 the 
restriction on the agent’s choice is exogenously imposed and, hence, intentions on the part of principal are 
omitted from the setting. The median transfer observed by F&K in EX10 is not significantly different 
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in TP10 can be interpreted in different ways and could activate other motives16, several 
factors change between EX10 and C10 which could drive the results in F&K. For 
instance, the fact that in EX10 the strategy space is bounded between 10 and 120 makes 
the comparison with the trust subgame of C10 difficult, even if one takes the different 
support of x into account as F&K and we do to rule out positive reciprocity. If the value 
of the minimum transfer affects individual decisions, e.g. acting as a reference point, the 
two subgames are hardly comparable and little can be said about the type of reciprocity 
driving individual behaviors. Moreover, in contrast with C10, in EX10 the agent makes 
only one choice that does not involve the strategy method. This limited choice 
transforms the game into a dictator-setting, which may also affects the results. Finally, 
as argued above, EX10 cannot control for the effect associated with a variation in the 
size of the choice set, which instead plays a crucial role in both C10 and TP10. Overall, 
we believe that although F&K’s interpretation of the difference between EX10 and C10 
should be taken into account, our interpretation in terms of positive reciprocity is more 
convincing. 
 
Our results can be used to differentiate between alternative explanations of individual 
reactions to control, such as Sliwka (2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). In 
Sliwka (2007), reactions to control derive from signals about general social norms that 
are sent by the controlling party. The author considers a pool of agents with three 
behavioral types: selfish, inequity averse and conformist, i.e. agents that change 
behavior depending on the signal sent by the controlling party. The decision to control 
(not to control) is interpreted as a signal that a large fraction of agents is expected to be 
selfish (inequity averse), which leads conformist agents to behave according to the 
generalized social norms. In this framework, the effect of control does not stem from 
principal-specific characteristics and the control decision of the third party should 
equally affect the updating about the generalized social norm. The prediction is thus that 
control by a third party should have the same effect as control by a second party. Our 
results, however, contradict that prediction. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), on the 
                                                                                                                                               
from the median transfer observed in their C10 without control, while the transfers when control is 
endogenous are significantly lower than when it is exogenous. This leads F&K to interpret hidden cost of 
control in terms of negative reciprocity 
16 For instance, an anonymous referee suggests that the third party’s decision not to control may be 
interpreted by the agent as a suggestion that being opportunistic is perfectly appropriate. However, if 
present, this signalling effect should also hold when the principal decides to abstain from control, which 
is not the case either in our data or in F&K’s data. 
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contrary, explain individual reactions to control on the basis of positive reciprocity. In 
their model, reduced transfers are the consequence of changed image concerns that 
directly relate to the principal's control decision. By controlling, the principal signals 
that “he is not worth impressing”, while by not controlling he signals the opposite. The 
signaling effect is thus principal-specific and it should disappear under third-party 
control. This prediction is indeed consistent with our findings. Our results suggest that 
positive reciprocity-based explanations are more consistent with the observed behavior 
than explanations based on conformism.  
 
That positive reciprocity, rather than preferences for autonomy or negative reciprocity, 
drives the behavior of agents in these interactions is the main contribution of this paper. 
In demonstrating this result, we contribute to a wider literature engaged with 
understanding the employment relation, hierarchy, coercion and the exercise of power 
(Fehr et al, 2013; Nikiforakis et al, 2014). Of course, the limited role played by 
preferences for autonomy in our very specific and highly stylized experimental setting 
should not be interpreted as a general claim about the irrelevance of this type of 
preferences, which have been proven to be very salient in other settings (see, for 
instance, Bartling et al, 2014). It is worth noting that the simplicity of the proposed 
experimental task (i.e., to report a natural number via a computer interface) may reduce 
the salience of self-determination motives among subjects. In addition, the SDT 
literature has studied autonomy in interaction with two other basic psychological needs: 
competence and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 2000).17 Such complex interplay may be 
difficult to recreate in simple experimental games. 
 
Future work should examine the extent to which preferences evolve over repeated 
principal-agent interactions and interactions in which the hierarchical relationship 
between subjects in the experiments may be made clearer either through framing or 
through changes in experimental design where the loci of control for the principal are 
more diverse. This may permit researchers to examine more unambiguously the extent 
to which autonomy and reciprocity may complement or substitute for each other and, 
therefore, the extent to which extrinsic benefits may crowd out or in the effort of agents.  
                                                 
17 Competence refers to a feeling of efficacy with respect to a particular goal or task. Relatedness is 
defined as a “sense of belongingness and connectedness to the persons, group, or culture disseminating a 
goal (see Deci and Ryan, 2000: p.64).  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table A.1 
Experimental Conditions 
 
Notes: Earnings are stated in dollars net of the show-up fee with standard deviations in parentheses. Third 
parties were simply paid the show-up fee and therefore would have no payoff net of the show-up fee.   
C10 Number of Sessions 4 
Number of Subjects 76 
Gender (% Female) 44% 
Average age 21.02  (2.34) 
Agents’ Average Earnings 20.14  (2.9486) 
Principals’ Average Earnings 7.73    (5.8972) 
TP10 Number of Sessions 7 
Number of Subjects 159 
Gender (% Female) 54% 
Average age 20.75  (4.2) 
Agents’ Average Earnings 20.66  (2.5930) 
Principals’ Average Earnings 6.69    (5.1860) 
Third Party’s Average Earnings 0 
